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In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security based on the
laws of physics. However, as demonstrated in recent quantum hacking theory and ex-
perimental papers, detection efficiency loophole can be fatal to the security of practical
QKD systems. Here, we describe the physical origin of detection efficiency mismatch
in various domains including spatial, spectral, and time domains and in various exper-
imental set-ups. More importantly, we prove the unconditional security of QKD even
with detection efficiency mismatch. We explicitly show how the key generation rate is
characterized by the maximal detection efficiency ratio between the two detectors. Fur-
thermore, we prove that by randomly switching the bit assignments of the detectors, the
effect of detection efficiency mismatch can be completely eliminated.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, security proof, detection
efficiency mismatch
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] provides a way for two legitimate users, Alice and
Bob, to share a secret key that is secure against an eavesdropper, Eve, who is only restricted
by quantum mechanics. After the successful sharing of the secret key, Alice and Bob can
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then use it in cryptographic applications such as secure communications and authentication.
Many previous unconditional security proofs for QKD [4–15] consider the case with perfect
devices, such as perfect single-photon sources. However, realistic devices are never perfect.
For example, weak coherent sources are widely used in practice to simulate single-photon
emissions. Thus, security proofs have to be extended to cover these practical imperfections
in order to guarantee the security of a practical system. Recently, the use of weak coherent
sources and threshold detectors have been considered by various security proofs [16–22]. In
this paper, we consider another realistic imperfection found in detectors, which is the depen-
dency of detection efficiency on some auxiliary dimension such as the arrival time of signal;
furthermore, the efficiencies of the two detectors can be different. We prove the unconditional
security for this case. In this paper, we consider a QKD scheme where Bob uses two separate
detectors for detecting bits “0” and “1”.
The general physical problem we are facing in practical QKD system with two detectors
is the detection efficiency loophole [23, 24]. This loophole underlies not only fundamental
physics like Bell inequalities, but also applied technology like QKD. Also, in practice, it is
hard to build two detectors that have exactly the same characteristics (e.g. frequency, time
and spatial responses). Moreover, the problem of detection efficiency mismatch is important
not only for gated detectors, but also for detectors with dead-times. Indeed, standard InGaAs
detectors (and even SSPDs) have dead-times. That is to say that after a detection event, a
detector becomes inactive for some prescribed time duration. If Bob registers a signal during
a time period when one detector is dead while the other one is still active, Eve will be able
to infer which detector clicks. Our paper is an illustration of how one can proceed to handle
this general problem of detection efficiency mismatch in the security of QKD.
In fact, attacks drawing on detection efficiency mismatch have been proposed before: the
faked states attack [25, 26] and the time-shift attack [27]. The faked-states attack [25, 26] is
an intercept-and-resend attack, which is challenging to implement because of synchronization
and interferometric stability issues. For this reason, the faked-states attack has never been
implemented experimentally. In contrast, the time-shift attack [27] does not involve any
measurement and is, therefore, easier to implement in this regard. Indeed, we have successfully
demonstrated the time-shift attack experimentally on a commercial QKD system [28], which
indicates that detection efficiency mismatch is a serious realistic issue that can have a fatal
effect on practical securitya.
The success of the faked-states attack and the time-shift attack relies on the existence
of detection efficiency mismatch and the assumption that Alice and Bob distill keys using
a standard security proof that ignores this efficiency mismatch. As we have noted before
[28, 30], once Alice and Bob are aware of an attack based on some imperfection, it may not
be too difficult for them to devise counter measures against it. On the other hand, counter-
measures against eavesdropping can often lead to new loopholes and/or be defeated by new
eavesdropping attacks. For instance, the four-state setting [31,32] by Bob (intended to counter
a Note that to implement the time-shift attack successfully, one may need to implement time compression of
signals. The signals being compressed here are strong classical pulses from Bob to Alice in a plug-and-play
system. Fortunately, compression of strong classical pulses is a mature standard technique that has been used
in industries for decades (see, e.g., [29]). For simplicity, the experiment in Ref. [28] did not implement this
mature standard technique but simulated this compression process by replacing the original laser source with
one that produces narrower pulses.
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attacks based on detection efficiency mismatch) can be defeated by a combination of the large-
pulse attack [33] and the time-shift attack [30,34]. Instead of implementing physical counter-
measures, another way to guard against attacks based on detection efficiency mismatch is
for Alice and Bob to take this imperfection into account when distilling keys. Because of
this imperfection, an extra amount of privacy amplification will be needed. In this paper, we
provide an unconditional security proof that takes detection efficiency mismatch into account,
and by using this proof, Alice and Bob will be able to determine the right amount of privacy
amplification needed to remove Eve’s information on the final key even in the presence of
detection efficiency mismatch. We note that our proof is valid even if Eve performs the most
general attack that correlates different signal transmissions.
In this paper, we consider the BB84 protocol [1], but the idea of our security proof can be
used for other protocols. For simplicity, for much of this paper, we consider that the input
to Bob are single-photon signals. The case of multi-photon input signals will be discussed
in Sec. 7.1. For each transmission by Alice, Eve resends two systems to Bob: one system
carrying the bit information and the other system representing the auxiliary system that the
efficiencies of the detectors respond to. We assume in this paper that the information-carrying
system is a qubit. On the other hand, the auxiliary system can have arbitrary dimension and
is completely controlled by Eve in order to produce different effects on Bob due to imperfect
detection efficiencies. More specifically, Eve can send Bob an arbitrary state in this auxiliary
system to induce different probabilities of detection for the two detectors. Overall, Bob’s
system is represented by an enlarged quantum space and the bit information only lives in
a qubit subspace of it. Thus, our security proof is one that applies to a protocol with an
enlarged quantum space (which has recently been formalized in Ref. [35]). Also, we note that
this auxiliary system essentially acts as a shield [36] that protects Alice and Bob’s key from
Eve. Thus, our proof serves as an example of shield analysis.
Bob’s measurement operates on both the qubit system (which carries the information)
and the auxiliary system (which affects the detection efficiencies) and we need a detector
model that incorporates both systems. In this paper, we do not attempt to treat the most
general measurements but to assume a slightly more restrictive detector model that does not
couple the two systems. In other words, our model applies whenever the information-carrying
dimension does not couple with the efficiency-affecting dimension in the detection process.
This detector model by no means covers all possible detection scenariosb but is general enough
to include many interesting ones (such as those described in Sec. 2) that arise in practice. It
is important to note that even though the detector model does not couple the two systems,
they can be arbitrarily coupled (entangled) in the input state sent by Eve.
To get a glimpse at our detector model, let’s first consider the case where there is no Eve
and no efficiency mismatch. In this case, the entanglement view of Alice’s and Bob’s systems
is simply the perfect EPR pair |00〉AB + |11〉AB. Now, supposing that there is efficiency
mismatch and each detector i has a constant efficiency ηi, the state can then be represented
as
√
η0 |00〉AB +
√
η1 |11〉AB, which can be regarded as a non-uniform EPR pair. This simple
case is a special case of what we consider in our security proof. In fact, we consider a detector
model that goes beyond the scalar efficiency model. Our model can incorporate, for example,
states of the form |00〉AB ⊗ (F0 |γ〉T ) + |11〉AB ⊗ (F1 |γ〉T ), where Fi is the filtering operation
bFor instance, our detector model does not cover the case when Bob’s Hilbert space is a qutrit.
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of detector i acting on system T modeling the detector’s efficiency response and |γ〉 is an
arbitrary state chosen by Eve to induce different effects on the two detectors. The difficulty
in proving the security is related to the non-uniformity in bits “0” and “1” of the overall state
and the fact the initial state in system T is arbitrary. Nevertheless, we propose a technique
that proves the security even though Eve can choose any state in system T .
Our proof considers that Alice uses a single-photon source. However, our result immedi-
ately applies to the case when Alice uses a phase-randomized weak coherent source, by using
the results of Ref. [17, 18]. Our proof is founded on Koashi’s general security proof based
on the uncertainty principle [18]. The essential strategy is to estimate how certain Bob can
predict Alice’s measurement outcomes in the basis conjugate to the key-generating basis. To
do this, we consider a virtual protocol in which Bob performs a virtual measurement on his
enlarged quantum space where the information-carrying qubit is embedded. His measurement
result then gives a good prediction of Alice’s.
Intuition tells us that the larger the mismatch between the two detectors is, the lower
the key generation rate becomes. We confirm this belief in our paper and explicitly quantify
the exact effect of the mismatch on the key generation rate. We show that the maximum
efficiency ratio between the two detectors is directly related to the key generation rate [see
Eqs. (27), (28), and (31)].
There has been much interest in security proofs of QKD based on fundamental principles
such as no-signaling faster than the speed of light and Bell’s inequality violations [37, 38].
In particular, the idea of device-independent security proofs has been proposed. So far a
complete proof of security along this line is still missing and such a proof idea only applies
to specialized attacks such as collective attacks. We remark that this paper, following our
earlier time-shift attack papers [27,28], serves to highlight a fundamental weakness of device-
independent security proof. Even if such a proof can be constructed in future for the most
general attack, it will not apply to most current practical QKD set-ups. This is because of the
existence of detection efficiency loophole and Eve’s potential ability to manipulate signals in
the auxiliary domain to bias the relative detection efficiency between two detectors. (Notice,
however, that, as we will show in Sec. 6, a four-phase setting idea can equalize the detection
efficiency of two detectors.)
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give an overview of the physical origin of
detection efficiency mismatch and how Eve might exploit this mismatch. We then introduce
our detector model in Sec 3. In Sec. 4, we consider the security proof for the noiseless case, in
which Eve does not introduce any bit or phase errors but only intervenes with the auxiliary
dimension. The study of the noiseless case is instructive as it illustrates clearly our proof
technique that is shared across both the noiseless and noisy cases. In Sec. 5, we provide the
unconditional security proof for the noisy case, in which Eve introduces bit and phase errors,
in addition to intervening with the auxiliary dimension. In Sec. 6, we show how randomly
switching the bit assignments of the two detectors for each quantum signal (similar to the
scheme proposed by Refs. [31, 32]) can completely eliminate the effect of detection efficiency
mismatch. In Sec. 7, we discuss how to handle multi-photon signals in our proof, with the
help of the results of other papers. Finally, we conclude in Sec. 8.
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Fig. 1. Mismatch in efficiency between two detectors. Due to the asymmetry between the two
detection channels the time responses of the two detectors may not be identical. Under normal
operation, signals are expected to arrive at time 0. On the other hand, Eve can launch a “time-shift
attack” in which she shifts the arrival times of the signals to say times t− or t+ in order to subject
the signals to different probabilities of being detected as bit “0” or bit “1”. Thus, because of this
difference in the detection probabilities of bit “0” and bit “1”, Eve can learn some information
about the key.
2 Practical detection efficiency mismatch and attacks
In this section, we consider detection efficiency mismatch in realistic QKD setups and possible
attack strategies that are based on detection efficiency mismatch. Without a security proof
that takes into account of detection efficiency mismatch, these attacks may compromise the
security of QKD systems. The security proof provided later in this paper takes detection
efficiency mismatch into account and allows Alice and Bob to defeat these attacks.
2.1 Time-domain detection efficiency mismatch
In a typical fiber-based QKD system operating at 1550nm wavelength, in order to minimize
the effect of dark counts, the two InGaAs detectors are usually gated to be active in a narrow
time window in which signals are expected to arrive. However, due to the different responses
of the two detectors and also the asymmetry between the two detection channels, the detectors
may have different efficiencies over time. Fig. 1 illustrates a mismatch in efficiency between
two detectors. Typically, the open windows of the two detectors are larger than the width
of the laser pulses. Thus, under normal operation, the signals arrive near the centre of
the two open windows so that the efficiencies for detecting bit “0” and bit “1” are similar.
However, it is possible for Eve to time shift the input signals to Bob causing a mismatch in
the efficiencies. In Ref. [27], we proposed a “time-shift attack” that basically draws on this
efficiency mismatch due to time shifting. Essentially, Eve time shifts the signals entering Bob
to say time t−. Whenever Bob announces that he has a detection, Eve knows that it is likely
that detector 0 has clicked because it has a higher efficiency at time t−. Thus, Eve obtains
some information about the bit value. In the extreme case that at a particular time shift, the
efficiency of one detector is positive and efficiency of the other detector is zero, Eve knows the
bit value exactly because only one detector can ever produce a click. Standard security proofs
that ignore efficiency mismatch may allow Eve to steal information in this way. On the other
hand, the security proof provided in this paper takes this mismatch into account and applies
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enough privacy amplification depending on the mismatch to remove Eve’s information. We
remark that a successful experimental demonstration of this attack has been performed by
us [28].
Note that when multiple pulses arrive in the same detection window, the efficiency of
the detection system may depend on the relative phases of these multiple pulses. This may
happen when there exist multiple reflection sites in the detection channel. We will establish
a detector model in Sec. 3 that is general enough to incorporate this correlation.
2.2 Space-domain detection efficiency mismatch
The space-domain efficiency mismatch is related to free-space QKD systems [39–46] where a
change in the spatial mode of the input light may affect the efficiencies of the two detection
channel differently. In order to illustrate this concept, we show in Fig. 2 a simple detection
setup. Here, the two output lights of the beamsplitter pass through the optical coupling
systems before being detected. In practice, there exists asymmetry between the two free-
space to fiber coupling systems. For example, the distances between the coupling systems
and the beamsplitter may not be identical and also the lenses of the coupling systems may
not be perfectly aligned with respect to the beamsplitter. If Eve changes the spatial mode
of the input laser beam (e.g., angle, lateral displacement), the losses in the two coupling
systems can potentially be different, leading to detection efficiency mismatch which Eve can
take advantage of. Let’s consider an extreme example. Suppose that the two single-photon
detectors (SPD’s) are identical, but the distance from the collecting lens of channel 1 to the
beamsplitter is twice the distance from the collecting lens of channel 2 to the beamsplitter
(see Fig. 2). In this case, if Eve changes the angle of the input laser beam, the resulting
lateral displacement of the laser beam at the surface of the lens of channel 1 is twice that at
the surface of the lens of channel 2. Thus, this induces higher efficiency for channel 2 than
for channel 1. In free-space QKD setups, four detectors are often used with passive basis
selection. In this case, it is conceivable that Eve manipulates the spatial mode of each signal
and thereby produces a bias towards one basis use.
In practice, the process of free-space optical alignment is quite complicated, with many
factors contributing to the coupling efficiency. Also, errors in the manufacturing process of
optical elements can lead to variations in the coupling efficiency. Spatial change to the input
laser beam can further enhance the variations. Thus, it is expected that a spatial attack can
be used to effectively create efficiency mismatch. Also, note that coupling efficiency mismatch
does not vary with time, which liberates Eve from dealing with time-dependent issues.
2.3 Frequency-domain detection efficiency mismatch
In a similar way, detectors may respond to different wavelengths with different efficiencies.
Thus, in principle, Eve may shift the frequency of the incoming signals at Bob to launch her
attack. An acousto-optic modulator can be used to shift the frequency of the input signal up
to a few GHz. On the other hand, by employing nonlinear optical materials, the wavelength
of light can be shifted by a few hundreds nm [47].
Wavelength filters can be used to ensure that only photons within certain spectral band
are permitted to reach the SPD’s. However, one must be careful about the placements of
the filters. If a separate filter is placed before each SPD, Eve may still be able to exploit
some efficiency mismatch, since the spectral responses of the two wavelength filters may not
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Fig. 2. Eve changes the incident angle of the input laser beam. Since the distance between
collecting lens 1 and the beamsplitter is not the same as the distance between collecting lens 2
and the beamsplitter, the laser beam arrives at different lateral displacements on the surfaces of
the collecting lenses, causing different losses and in turn a mismatch in the detection efficiencies.
Thus, because of this difference in the detection probabilities of bit “0” and bit “1”, Eve may learn
some information about the key if Alice and Bob are not aware of this mismatch.
fully overlap and thus shifting in frequency may still lead to different efficiencies. Thus, one
simple counter measure is to place one wavelength filter at the entrance of Bob’s system.
Conventional SPD’s based on Si-APD or InGaAs-APD have a spectral response range of a
few hundreds nanometer, while the bandwidth of a narrow-band filter may be 1 nm. Thus,
the responses of the SPD’s may be regarded as identical. On the other hand, other types
of SPD’s, such as the up-conversion SPD’s, may have a bandwidth less than 1 nm due to
the requirement of phase matching in the up-conversion process. In this case, a wavelength
filter with a bandwidth of 1 nm may not be able to eliminate the efficiency mismatch and the
SPD’s may still respond differently to photons with different wavelengths (especially when
the wavelengths of the input photons get close to the edge of the spectral response window);
thus, a spectral attack may still be possible.
3 A general detector model
In this section, we describe a model for detectors in a QKD system that is general enough to
cover a wide variety of efficiency dependencies. Our security proof with efficiency mismatch
taken into account will be built on this detector model. Fig. 3 shows a QKD system with
two detectors having efficiencies dependent on some auxiliary dimension (which, in this case,
is time). We are interested in constructing a POVM (positive-operator-valued measurement)
for Bob’s detector package for detecting bit “0” and bit “1”, taking into account the im-
perfect efficiencies. Bob’s detector package accepts two systems as input: system B for the
qubit representing the information-carrying qubit state of the QKD protocol, and system T
representing the auxiliary domain (e.g. time, space, and frequency) related to the detection
efficiency.
Before we begin the construction of the POVM of Bob’s detector package, we state a
few assumptions. We assume in the proof that Eve always sends single-photon signals to
Bob (see also Sec. 7.1 for handling multi-photon input signals). Furthermore, she sends Bob
a qubit state in system B. Dark counts in the detectors may be modeled by Eve sending
8 Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Fig. 3. There are two detectors in the QKD system, one for detecting bit “0” and the other
for detecting bit “1”. The two detectors have different efficiencies and their efficiency responses
are characterized by matrices F0†F0 and F1†F1. In this example, the efficiencies depend on the
arrival time of the incoming signals, and the diagonal elements of Fi
†Fi expressed in the basis that
represents the arrival times are plotted in the figure on the right. The data of this figure comes
from an actual experiment that we performed to demonstrate the time-shift attack [28].
random qubits. In addition, we assume that in the detector model there is no coupling
between the information-carrying qubit system and the auxiliary system. This means that in
the detection process, information decoding operations (such as beam splitting) on the qubit
system is not affected by the auxiliary system. This model is not the most general one but
is consistent with the three detection scenarios we described in Sec. 2. This can be seen by
noting that information bits “0” and “1” (encoded in polarization or phase) are discerned
by a beam splitter separating the incoming signal into two paths, and the beam splitter acts
independently of the arrival time, frequency, or spatial mode of the signal. Thus, we can
assume that the POVM elements take a tensor product form in the qubit system and the
auxiliary system.
We now characterize the POVM of the whole detector package consisting of two detectors.
Let’s first focus on the Z-basis measurement by Bob. In this case, the POVM elements for
measuring bit “0” and bit “1” can be represented by
M0 = |0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ (F †0F0)T (1)
M1 = |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ (F †1F1)T (2)
where Fi
†Fi represents the efficiency matrix of detector i that we will discuss in the following.
Thus, the POVM of Bob’s measurement is {M0,M1, I −M0 −M1}, where the last element
represents the case of not getting a click by Bob. In the special case that the two detectors have
constant efficiencies, Fi
†Fi = ηi becomes a scalar and Bob’s POVM elements for conclusive
events become Mi = ηi |iz〉B 〈iz| , i = 0, 1. For the later use, it is convenient to express Bob’s
measurement as a filtering operation followed by a simple measurement. The filtering is
Fz = |0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ (F0)T + |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ (F1)T (3)
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and it is followed by the measurement {|0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ IT , |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ IT }. In a similar way,
Bob’s X-basis measurement can be defined as the filtering operation
Fx = |+〉B 〈+| ⊗ (F0)T + |−〉B 〈−| ⊗ (F1)T , (4)
followed by the measurement {|+〉B 〈+|⊗ IT , |−〉B 〈−|⊗ IT }. In Eqs. (1)-(4), we have ignored
the possibility of double click events, in view of their low probabilities. However, as noted in
ILM [16] and GLLP [17], one should assign random probabilities to double click events.
The POVM corresponding to detector i consists of two outcomes {Fi†Fi, I−Fi†Fi}, where
the first (second) element corresponds to having (not having) a detection. Thus, when the
input to detector i is ρ in the auxiliary domain, the probability of detection is Tr(ρFi
†Fi). In
general, the efficiency response Fi
†Fi is a full matrix:
Fi
†Fi =


ηi(t1, t1) · · · ηi(t1, td)
...
...
ηi(td, t1) · · · ηi(td, td)

 . (5)
This is because there may be a natural or convenient basis to represent it (e.g. Fi may be
expressed in the basis in which one tests the detectors). Here, we assume that the auxiliary
domain has a finite dimension d and it is known to Alice and Bob. Also, note that the two
detectors may not be diagonalizable in the same basis.
One example of the auxiliary domain is the arrival time of the signal (see Fig. 3). The
efficiency of gated single-photon detectors can be sensitive to the arrival time of the signals
and the efficiency response Fi
†Fi is conveniently represented in the basis of arrival times.
Thus, one may regard the diagonal term ηi(tj , tj) as the efficiency of detector i at time tj ,
and the dimension d is the number of allowable time shifts.
In many cases, one may completely characterize the detectors’ responses Fi (with both
diagonal and off-diagonal terms). For example, when the auxiliary domain is polarization, the
dimensions of Fi is 2×2, and its elements can be found by sending signals to the detector with
vertical polarization, horizontal polarization, and the in-phase and out-of-phase superpositions
of vertical and horizontal polarizations. On the other hand, when the auxiliary domain is time,
there would be infinitely many uncountable time shifts and the dimensions of Fi would be
infinite. Thus, it may appear that perfect characterization is difficult. However, with a small
adjustment, the case of time-dependent efficiency can still be treated with finite dimensions,
as we discuss next.
3.1 Time-dependent efficiency
3.1.1 Characterization with a finite number of samples
Let us consider that the detectors have an efficiency dependent on the arrival time of the sig-
nals. This is the case for detectors operating in gated Geiger mode (e.g., see our experimental
time-shift attack paper [28] for how practical efficiency mismatch is exploited by Eve). When
time is the auxiliary dimension, the efficiency response matrix Fi
†Fi becomes continuous and
contains uncountable elements. This may be problematic to our analysis. However, with an
additional minor assumption, this problem can be resolved and we can characterize Fi
†Fi
with a finite number of elements.
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PM
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Fig. 4. An input signal can be split into more than one pulse by using beamsplitters. The phase
modulators control the the relative phases between these multiple pulses. One may repeat this
setup many times to get a superposition of many pulses.
The key assumption is that a narrow-band Gaussian-shaped frequency filter is installed at
the entrance of Bob, with the center frequency matching that of the quantum signal. Thus, the
incoming signals are filtered before reaching the detectors. The main idea is that the signal
after the narrow-band filter must also be narrow-band. Thus, according to the Nyquist-
Shannon sampling theorem [48], a narrow-band signal can be fully represented by its discrete
samples. This means that the input to the detector can always be represented by a series
of pulses located at fixed time instants, and thus this allows us to characterize the efficiency
response of the detector only at those fixed time instants. Furthermore, when we consider the
gating window to have a fixed length, we can characterize the detector with a finite number
of pulses sent within the gating window. Therefore, with an addition of a frequency filter, the
characterization of the time-dependent efficiency of the detectors becomes discrete and finite-
dimensional, and thus is readily applicable to our security proof. The details are analyzed in
Appendix A. Note that the use of a Gaussian-shaped frequency filter facilitates the use of
Gaussian pulses to test the detectors, and Gaussian pulses are easy to generate in practice.
By the same token, adding a time filter makes the characterization of frequency-dependent
efficiency discrete.
We remark that the detector and its efficiency response Fi
†Fi do not change with time.
What is time dependent is that the detector’s efficiency depends on the arrival times of the
input signals relative to the detector trigger in a gating window.
3.1.2 Practical setup for characterization
Here, we discuss how to test the time-dependent efficiencies of a detector, denoted by Fi
†Fi.
Suppose that we choose a basis for Fi
†Fi such that its diagonal elements represent the arrival
times of the incoming signal. In this basis, the diagonal elements can be tested easily by
sending signals into the detector at different times. The separation between two adjacent test
times is determined by the bandwidth of the frequency filter as discussed above, and the test
pulse shape should ideally be Gaussian with a width also determined by the bandwidth of the
filter. The off-diagonal elements can be found by sending in signals in superpositions of the
test times with different phases. One possible practical setup to generate superpositions of
the test times is shown in Fig. 4. Ideally, one should test the detector using a single-photon
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source, since this is consistent with the assumption we use in this paper that Eve always sends
single-photon signals to Bob. In principle, the off-diagonal terms may not be zero, since it is
conceivable that there exist multiple reflection sites in the detection channel that can give rise
to correlations between pulses of different arrival times. However, in practice, we speculate
that the multi-reflected signals are much weaker than the original signals, and therefore the
off-diagonal terms may be negligible compared to the diagonal terms. It would be interesting
for future study to test practical detectors for the existence of this correlation.
4 Security proof for the noiseless case
In this section, we prove the security of the case where Eve does not introduce any bit or
phase errors but only intervenes with the auxiliary dimension. Since we assume Alice uses a
single-photon source, the initial state prepared by Alice is
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB. (6)
Eve does not introduce any noise and she simply attaches an extra system T that represents
her intervention in the auxiliary dimension, giving
−→ (|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗ |γ〉TE . (7)
Note that the state in T is in general mixed, and thus is purified with system E in this
representation. Now, the state in BT is sent to Bob and he performs the filtering in Eq. (3)
to get
−→ |Ψ1〉 = Fz [(|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗ |γ〉TE ]
= |+〉A [|0〉B F0 |γ〉TE + |1〉B F1 |γ〉TE ] + (8)
|−〉A [|0〉B F0 |γ〉TE − |1〉B F1 |γ〉TE ]
where Fi acts on system T . In the actual protocol, after the filtering operation Fz , both
Alice and Bob perform measurements on their systems in the Z basis to obtain their raw
keys. Bob corrects the bit errors in his raw key according to the error syndromes sent by
Alice through a secret classical channel, thus making Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys the same.
After this error correction step, they multiply the same random matrix to their raw keys (for
privacy amplification) to arrive at the final secret key. The essence of Koashi’s proof [18] is
that since the final secret key is derived from Alice’s raw key obtained in the Z basis, Alice
and Bob’s main goal is to guarantee that system A of Alice is in an X eigenstate. In this
case, because the uncertainty of system A in the X basis is minimized, by the uncertainty
principle, Eve’s uncertainty of system A in the Z basis is maximized, and thus the final key
is secret to Eve.
Thus, to prove security using Koashi’s proof, we consider that Bob performs a virtual
measurement on system BT in order to predict Alice’s X-basis measurement outcome on
system A (see Fig. 5(b)). Essentially, system T (though not carrying bit information) acts as
a shield [36] that protects Alice and Bob’s key from Eve. Loosely speaking, the uncertainty
associated with using Bob’s virtual measurement to predict Alice’s X-basis measurement out-
come is related to Eve’s information on the key before privacy amplification. The advantage
of using Koashi’s proof is that there is no restriction on Bob’s virtual measurement on system
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 5. The top figure shows the actual measurement by Bob to general key bits in the Z-basis,
with the corresponding bit error rate of eb. The middle figure shows the virtual measurement by
Bob for helping Alice predict her X-basis measurement outcomes on system A for the key bits
generated from Z-basis measurements, with the corresponding (virtual) phase error rate of ep.
The bottom figure shows the actual measurement by Bob in the X-basis, with the corresponding
(actual) phase error rate of e′p.
BT . He is allowed to perform any quantum measurement after the filter Fz . This measure-
ment is not performed in practice and thus whether it is physically realizable is not a concern.
The only concern (or restriction) is that we have to make sure that statistics of virtual proto-
col can be well estimated using those of the actual protocol. Thus, we would like to construct
a virtual measurement for Bob aiming at predicting Alice’s X-basis measurement outcome
with high certainty.
Procrustean method of filtering for Bob’s virtual measurement
The objective for Bob is to distinguish the two non-orthogonal states in system BT corre-
sponding to Alice’s |+〉 and |−〉 states in Eq. (8). The non-orthogonality stems from the
efficiency mismatch between the two detectors and this makes the problem more difficult
than the perfect-detector case. What complicates the problem even further is that the state
Bob tries to measure is not known a priori, owing to the fact that the initial state in system
T is unknown. Nevertheless, we propose a simple way to identify the two non-orthogonal
states, which is by orthogonalizing them with a filter that may succeed with a probability less
than one. The idea of orthogonalizing each signal independently is known as the Procrustean
method of filtering [49]. Although our filtering method may not be optimal since we are oper-
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ating on individual signals independently, it does provide a simple and intuitive method that
magically orthogonalizes the two states even though the initial state in system T is unknown.
In this paper, we specialize in a trick to constructing such a virtual measurement by
inverting the filtering operations Fi in Eq. (8) as follows. Bob first performs a filtering
GBT = |0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ (CF−10 )T + |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ (CF−11 )T (9)
on system BT of Eq. (8) and then performs an X-basis measurement on system B (i.e., with
POVM {|+〉B 〈+| ⊗ IT , |−〉B 〈−| ⊗ IT }). Here, we introduce a d× d matrix C to ensure that
GBT is a valid filtering operation (i.e., C is chosen so that G
†
BTGBT ≤ I). See Appendix B
for the derivation of C.
After applying this filter GBT to Eq. (8), the whole state becomes
−→ GBT |Ψ1〉
= [|++〉AB + |−−〉AB ]⊗ C |γ〉TE . (10)
where C acts on system T . The magic of the filter GBT is that even though the initial state
of system T is unknown, the filter is still able to concentrate an perfect EPR pair in system
AB. Since now there is an EPR pair in system AB, an X-basis measurement outcome on
system B is perfectly correlated with an X-basis measurement outcome on system A. Thus,
when Bob measures in the X basis on system B of the successfully filtered state in Eq. (10),
he is able to predict Alice’s X-basis measurement outcome with complete certainty, and this
is enough to prove security. Once Alice and Bob know that Alice’s state is an X eigenstate,
the final key derived from the Z-basis measurements of Alice’s state is then secret to Eve.
The probability of successful filtering is
psucc =
Tr[GBT |Ψ1〉 〈Ψ1|G†BT ]
Tr[|Ψ1〉 〈Ψ1|] (11)
=
2 〈γ| (C†C)T ⊗ IE |γ〉TE
〈γ| (F †0F0 + F †1F1)T ⊗ IE |γ〉TE
. (12)
Therefore, among all the N qubit pairs shared by Alice and Bob, Bob is able to predict
Alice’s X-basis measurement outcomes of Npsucc key bits, since he knows whether the virtual
filtering on each bit succeeded or not when it is performed. By applying the arguments of
Koashi’s proof, the secret key generation rate is simply psucc. Since the state |γ〉 in Eq. (12)
is chosen by Eve, the worst-case final secret key generation rate on detected signals is
Rnoiseless = max
C
min
|γ〉
psucc, (13)
which is a lower bound on the key generation rate. The detectors’ efficiency matrices F †0F0
and F †1F1 are assumed to be known. In this case, the final secret key generation rate on
detected signals is found by solving Eq. (13) (see Appendix B for detail) and it is equal to
Rnoiseless =
2
1 +max
(
D1,
1
D1
, . . . , Dd,
1
Dd
) (14)
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where D = diag(D1, . . . , Dd) is a diagonal matrix with positive real elements (which are the
eigenvalues) and is determined from the Hermitian decomposition of F0(F
†
1F1)
−1F †0 = UDU
†.
The elements of D represents the ratios of the efficiencies of the two detectors and when the
assignment of F0 and F1 is reversed, D would also be inverted. If the efficiency matrices Fi
are only partially known, one can find the worst-case key generation rate by also minimizing
Eq. (13) over them. Throughout the derivation, we have assumed that F0 and F1 have full
rank (or invertible). Otherwise, we can show that the key generation rate is zero (see below).
Thus, characterization of the detectors is very important.
Special case 1: Fi is not invertible
Suppose that F0 is not invertible (i.e., not full rank) and the nullspace of F0 and that of F1 are
differentc(F1 may be invertible). In this case, the worst-case final key generation rate is zero.
One may observe this from Eq. (8). Eve may choose |γ〉 to be in the nullspace of F0 and not
in the nullspace of F1, leading to system A completely disentangled with system B. Thus, no
key can be generated in this case, since entanglement is a precondition for generating secret
keys [50].
Special case 2: only diagonal terms are known
Note that if only the diagonal terms of F †0F0 and F
†
1F1 are known, the worst-case final key
generation rate is zero. Since only the diagonal terms are known, the final key generation
rate is determined by minimizing over the off-diagonal terms. One can imagine that the off-
diagonal terms are chosen such that F0 is not invertible and F1 is invertible. Thus, this case
is reduced to special case 1, which allows us to conclude that the final key generation rate in
this case is zero.
Special case 3: F0 and F1 are diagonal
Here, we consider the special case that the Bob’s detectors’ responses to the time-shifts,
Fi
†Fi, i = 0, 1, are diagonal, i.e., there is no correlation in the efficiencies between time-shifts.
Suppose the efficiency matrices are Fi
†Fi = diag(ηi(t1), ηi(t2), . . .). We compute the final key
generation rate using Eq. (14). Note that F0(F
†
1F1)
−1F †0 = diag
(
η0(t1)
η1(t1)
, η0(t2)η1(t2) , . . .
)
. Using
this fact, the final key generation rate on detected signals is
Rnoiseless, diag = min
t
2min(η0(t), η1(t))
η0(t) + η1(t)
. (15)
5 General security proof
In this section, we prove security under the most general attack by Eve in which she can
coherently process the signals sent by Alice and perform a joint measurement on her ancillas.
In this general case, Eve’s action on the lth bit can be described by her preparing a pure
state system T (the auxiliary domain to which the detectors respond) and performing a
superoperation on both systems B and T , as follows:
|Ψ(l)2 〉 =
∑
i
E
(l,i)
BT (|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗ |0〉T ⊗ |i〉E (16)
cIf F0 and F1 have the same nullspaces, then they can be reduced to two invertible matrices.
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where E
(l,i)
BT is the operation element for the lth bit and it is responsible for introducing bit
and phase errors. Note that it can depend on Eve’s action on all other bits. Now, the state
in BT is sent to Bob and he performs the filtering in Eq. (3) as in the noiseless case to get
−→ Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉 . (17)
As in Fig. 5(b), in order to estimate the amount of privacy amplification, we assume that
Bob performs the virtual measurement by applying a filter to Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉. Bob applies the same
filter GBT in Eq. (9) as in the noiseless case and we have
−→ |Ψ(l)3 〉 = GBTFz |Ψ(l)2 〉 . (18)
Thus, after Bob measures in the X basis on system B of the successfully filtered state in
Eq. (18), he is able to predict Alice’sX-basis measurement outcome with uncertainty indicated
by the virtual phase error probability of |Ψ(l)3 〉. On the other hand, the actual phase error
probability (e′p) is not generated by this state; it is generated by some other state, namely
Fx |Ψ(l)2 〉 [Fig. 5(c)]. Thus, we need to estimate the virtual phase error probability (ep) of
the filtered state |Ψ(l)3 〉 [Fig. 5(b)] from the actual phase error probability (e′p) [Fig. 5(c)]. In
addition, we need to lower bound the probability of successful filtering of the state Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉.
Overall, we are interested in the formulas for the actual bit error probability (eb) of Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉,
the virtual phase error probability (ep) of |Ψ(l)3 〉, the actual phase error probability (e′p) of
Fx |Ψ(l)2 〉, and the virtual filtering probability (psucc,noisy) of Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉:
eb =
∑
l Tr[PbitFz |Ψ(l)2 〉 〈Ψ(l)2 |F †z ]∑
l 〈Ψ(l)2 |F †zFz |Ψ(l)2 〉
(19)
ep =
∑
l Tr[Pphase |Ψ(l)3 〉 〈Ψ(l)3 |]∑
l〈Ψ(l)3 |Ψ(l)3 〉
(20)
e′p =
∑
l Tr[PphaseFx |Ψ(l)2 〉 〈Ψ(l)2 |F †x ]∑
l 〈Ψ(l)2 |F †xFx |Ψ(l)2 〉
(21)
psucc,noisy =
∑
l〈Ψ(l)3 |Ψ(l)3 〉∑
l 〈Ψ(l)2 |F †zFz |Ψ(l)2 〉
(22)
where Pbit = |01〉AB 〈01| + |10〉AB 〈10| and Pphase = |+−〉AB 〈+−| + |−+〉AB 〈−+|. These
quantities are specified by Eve through her selection of the attack strategy E
(l,i)
BT . Although
there seems to be many dimensions in the attack strategy (as l runs over all qubit pairs
and i over any range), one can simplify the attack into a small number of dimensions when
probabilities are concerned.
For the case we consider in this paper, it is shown in Appendix C that the various proba-
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bilities of interest in Eqs. (19)-(22) can be simplified with a collective attack to
eb =
Tr[ρE(Z˜10 ⊗ F †0F0 + Z˜01 ⊗ F †1F1)]
Tr[ρE((Z˜00 + Z˜10)⊗ F †0F0 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F †1F1)]
(23)
ep =
Tr[ρE(X˜−+ + X˜+−)⊗ C†C]
Tr[ρE(X˜++ + X˜−+ + X˜+− + X˜−−)⊗ C†C]
(24)
e′p =
Tr[ρE(X˜−+ ⊗ F †0F0 + X˜+− ⊗ F †1F1)]
Tr[ρE((X˜++ + X˜−+)⊗ F †0F0 + (X˜−− + X˜+−)⊗ F †1F1)]
(25)
psucc,noisy =
Tr[ρE((Z˜00 + Z˜10 + Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ C†C)]
Tr[ρE((Z˜00 + Z˜10)⊗ F †0F0 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F †1F1)]
(26)
where ρE represents Eve’s action, which is averaged over all signals, and has dimensions 4d×4d
(again, d× d are the dimensions of Fi and C) and C is from Eq. (B.16). Here, Z˜i,j and X˜i,j
are constant 4× 4 matrices given in Eq. (C.11). [Note that we are using C determined in the
noiseless case. However, it can be shown (in a similar fashion as in the noiseless case) that
the same C is obtained if we maximize the filtering probability psucc,noisy over C (which is
related to problem (P1’) in Section 5.2).]
It is worth noting that the security proofs for a three-state protocol [51] and the SARG04
protocol [52, 53] that share the same technique (the Azuma’s inequality [54]) as the current
paper reduce to collective attacks in a more straightforward manner. In their cases, the nor-
malizations of all probabilities of interest (the bit and phase error probabilities) are the same
and this together with the concavity of the relations between the probabilities immediately
reduce joint attacks to collective attacks. In the case of the current paper, the normalizations
(i.e., the denominators of Eqs. (19)-(22)) are different; and thus we need a more involved
analysis to reduce to collective attacks.
We remark that in our general method, we use the Procrustean Method and the trick
of inverting the detection efficiency filters when constructing the virtual filter. It is well-
known (e.g. Ref. [49]) that in entanglement distillation theory the Procrustean Method is, in
general, sub-optimal. On the other hand, our method, despite its sub-optimality, provides an
instructive and easily understandable way to prove security.
5.1 Bounding filtering probability psucc,noisy and phase error probability ep
Both the virtual filtering probability (psucc,noisy) and virtual phase error probability (ep) ulti-
mately determine the key generation rate (cf. Eq. (31)). Thus, we bound them by numerically
optimizing them over Eve’s action subject to the observed bit and phase error rates. One
important tool that we rely on to identify the the observed rates with the corresponding prob-
abilities is the Azuma’s inequality [54], which asserts that the sum of the probabilities for an
event over all trials is asymptotically close to the observed count of the event (this inequality
was similarly used in other security proofs [51–53,55,56])d. Thus, the rate of successful virtual
d In order to see how the Azuma’s inequality is applied to Eqs. (19)-(22), consider eb in Eq. (19) as a concrete
example. We apply the Azuma’s inequality to the numerator and denominator separately. The numerator in
the right hand side of Eq. (19) is Pr{bit error and conclusive result} and the denominator is Pr{conclusive
result}. Since eb is defined as the bit error rate conditional on conclusive bits, we can apply the Azuma’s
inequality to the numerator of Eq. (19) to get the actual number of bits with error and apply the Azuma’s
inequality to the denominator to get the actual number of conclusive bits. Dividing these two numbers gives
us eb.
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filtering can be lower bounded as
minimize psucc,noisy
subject to eb = observed eb (P1)
e′p = observed e
′
p
and the virtual phase error rate can be upper bounded as
maximize ep
subject to eb = observed eb (P2)
e′p = observed e
′
p
where the optimization is over Eve’s action ρE and the formulas for the error probabilities and
the filtering probability are from Eqs. (23)-(26). Note that both problems (P1) and (P2) can
be expressed as a polynomial problem by multiplying the denominator of each fraction in each
of the constraints; and thus the two problems can be solved numerically and efficientlye[57,58].
When eb = e
′
p = 0, solving these two problems gives the same noiseless-case result in
Eq. (14).
When F0 = F1 (meaning that there is no efficiency mismatch), it can easily be checked
that psucc,noisy = 1 and ep = e
′
p, as expected.
We remark that although both problems (P1) and (P2) involve only the average error
rates, improvement in the bounds may be obtained by, for example, separating the error rates
for bits “0” and “1”.
5.2 Suboptimal bounds
In order to better understand the relationship between the efficiency mismatch and the phase
error probability ep or the filtering probability psucc,noisy, we compute suboptimal bounds
for these two quantities. These bounds are obtained by simply dropping the constraints in
problems (P1) and (P2). Specifically, we solve
minimize psucc,noisy (P1’)
and
maximize
ep
e′p
(P2’)
where the optimization is over Eve’s action ρE and the formulas for the error probabilities and
the filtering probability are from Eqs. (23)-(26). Solving these problems gives (see Appendix D
for detail)
psucc,noisy ≥ min
(
D1,
1
D1
, . . . , Dd,
1
Dd
)
(27)
ep
e′p
≤ max
(
D1,
1
D1
, . . . , Dd,
1
Dd
)
(28)
eIt seems that considering rank-one ρE is always sufficient to achieve the optimal solution based on our
simulation results. However, we have not been able to prove this. Note that convexity/concavity of (P1)/(P2)
does not immediately give rise to this conclusion.
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whereD = diag(D1, . . . , Dd) is a diagonal matrix with positive real elements and is determined
from the Hermitian decomposition of F0(F
†
1F1)
−1F †0 = UDU
†. In other words, the virtual
filtering probability and the virtual phase error probability are related to the minimum and
maximum efficiency ratios between the two detectors. Note that the right hand side of Eq. (27)
is the inverse of that of Eq. (28).
5.3 Key generation rate
After the virtual filtering operation, Bob can predict Alice’s X-basis measurement outcomes
with an error probability of ep for Npsucc,noisy key bits. In light of Koashi’s proof, Bob’s pre-
diction removes some uncertainty on Alice’s X-basis measurement outcomes (through Bob’s
communication to Alice). The remaining uncertainty can be removed (with high proba-
bility) by Alice performing hashing on the key bits in m rounds, where m is less than N
in general. In our case, m = (N − Npsucc,noisy) + Npsucc,noisyH2(ep) where the first (sec-
ond) part represents the key bits for which Bob’s virtual filter did not (did) succeed. Here,
H2(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy function. According to the proof,
the number of secure key bits generated is (without error correction)
KPA = N −m
= Npsucc,noisy(1 −H2(ep)). (29)
The amount of (pre-shared) secret key bits sacrificed for error correction using encrypted
one-way communication is
KEC = NH2(eb). (30)
Combining them gives the final key generation rate on detected signals:
Rnoisy = [KPA −KEC]/N
= psucc,noisy(1−H2(ep))−H2(eb) (31)
where psucc,noisy and ep are obtained by solving problems (P1) and (P2), respectively. Alter-
natively, they may be obtained from the suboptimal bounds in Eqs. (27) and (28). Also, it
is worth noting that we do not need to separately bound psucc,noisy and ep with two separate
optimization problems. We can instead minimize the key generation rate in Eq. (31) subject
to the observed error rates (which are the common constraints of (P1) and (P2)). However,
this problem is not a convex optimization problem (due to the nonlinear equality constraints)
or a polynomial optimization problem (due to the non-polynomial objective function) and
thus may not easily be solved optimally and efficiently.
5.4 Example 1: scalar efficiencies
Consider a QKD system in which the two detectors have constant but different efficiencies.
This means that the detection efficiency matrices, Fi
†Fi, i = 0, 1, are scalar. In this case, one
can easily compute the noiseless key generation rate on detected signals by using Eq. (14) or
Eq. (15) to be
Rnoiseless, scalar =
2min(η0, η1)
η0 + η1
, (32)
C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma 19
where ηi = Fi
†Fi. On the other hand, this formula for the scalar efficiency case can be
obtained by the following simple argument. Bob can artificially make the efficiencies of the
two detectors the same by randomly discarding some detection events of the detector with
the higher efficiency in the data postprocessing step. To arrive at the above formula, suppose
that Alice sends N signals (with equal numbers of bits “0” and “1”) to Bob. Then, Bob will
detect N2 η0 number of “0”s and
N
2 η1 number of “1”s, giving the total number of detected
signals N2 (η0+η1). Now, assuming that η0 < η1, Bob discards some of detection events of the
detector corresponding to bit “1”, so that effectively N2 η0 number of “0”s and
N
2 η0 number
of “1”s are retained to form the final key (there is no error correction or privacy amplification
since there is no noise). Thus, the final key length is Nη0, and dividing this by the total
number of detected signals gives Eq. (32).
Now, let’s consider the noisy case. The above simple argument with data discarding can
also handle the noisy case. After the artificial equalization of the two detection efficiencies,
the situation Alice and Bob are facing becomes that considered in Shor-Preskill [7]. This can
be seen as follows. When the efficiencies are scalar, Bob’s actual measurement in the W -basis
(W = X,Z) is described by the filtering operation Fw in Eqs. (3)-(4) (which is a diagonal
matrix in the W -basis and represents the efficiency mismatch) followed by the standard W -
basis measurement. Now, the artificial equalization can be described by another filter Fˆw
which is diagonal in the W -basis such that FwFˆw = cI where c is a constant independent
of the basis W , meaning that data discarding removes the efficiency mismatch in both bases
while incurring some loss. Essentially, this is the same situation as Shor-Preskill’s with a
basis-independent loss, and thus their key rate formula can be applied. Taking into account
of the loss, the key generation rate for the data-discarding argument is
Rnoisy, scalar, discarding =
2min(η0, η1)
η0 + η1
(1−H2(ep)−H2(eb)). (33)
Here, eb and ep are the error rates after the data-discarding process corresponding to the Z-
basis and X-basis measurement outcomes, respectively. Also, the standard squash model for
BB84 [17,59,60] can be applied here to handle threshold detectors so that the incoming signals
can always be treated as qubits and dark counts as random qubits. This data-discarding
argument in conjunction with the Shor-Preskill’s proof bears similarity with our formulation.
In fact, the equalization filter Fˆx for the X-basis is the same as the virtual filter GBT in
Eq. (9) in our formulation. In our formulation, we assume that this virtual filter GBT is
not and/or cannot be performed in practice and therefore we estimate the virtual phase
error rate ep from the actual phase error rate e
′
p through problem (P2). On the other hand,
with the data-discarding argument, this virtual filter is actually performed through the data-
discarding process. Thus, one can actually measure the “virtual” phase error rate ep directly
(cf. Fig. 5(b)) without solving problem (P2). This means that our estimation of the virtual
phase error rate ep may be sub-optimal, and, in contrast, the data-discarding protocol allows
us to obtain it directly and accurately. Therefore, the data-discarding protocol may give us a
higher key generation rate than our general method. A similar argument goes for the successful
filtering probability psucc,noisy. This quantity can also be obtained without solving problem
(P1) since the virtual filter GBT is actually performed. On the other hand, an analogous
argument does not apply to the bit error rate since, in our formulation, no filtering is applied
to the states to be measured in the Z basis, whereas, in the data-discarding argument, the
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data-discarding filter Fˆz is applied. In summary, the difference between our formulation
and the data-discarding argument is that we assume that the virtual filter is not performed
in practice. By actually performing the filter, the data-discarding argument avoids solving
problems (P1) and (P2). Nevertheless, one may proceed to solve problems (P1) and (P2)
with an addition constraint that Eve’s attack is symmetric between bits “0” and “1” in both
bases to obtain ep = e
′
p and psucc,noisy =
2min(η0,η1)
η0+η1
. Using these results, our formulation in
Eq. (31) gives the key generation rate
Rnoisy, scalar =
2min(η0, η1)
η0 + η1
(1−H2(ep))−H2(eb). (34)
Note that the bit error rate eb here corresponds to that before data discarding. By comparing
Eqs. (33) and (34), we can see that the data-discarding argument gives a higher key generation
rate than our general technique when the bit error rate remains the same before and after
data discarding. Nevertheless, this simple data-discarding argument does not extend to the
general case with non-scalar efficiency matrices, whereas our general technique can handle
this general case.
5.5 Example 2: two-dimensional efficiency matrices
In this example, we illustrate the application of our proof to the non-trivial case with non-
scalar efficiency matrices. Suppose that we have a polarization-coding QKD system in which
the two detectors have imperfect efficiency responses to the arrival times of signals (assuming
that only two arrival times are allowed for simplicity). The two detectors have the following
detection efficiency matrices:
F †0F0 =
[
.8 −.2
−.2 .4
]
, F †1F1 =
[
.3 .1
.1 .9
]
. (35)
Here, the basis used to represent these matrices is the arrival times. Thus, for example, the
first detector responds with 80% efficiency when hit by a signal arriving at the first time
instant. Also, the fact that the matrices are non-diagonal means that the detectors have
non-trivial efficiency responses to signals entangled across the two time instants.
We first compute the efficiency ratios between the two detectors, based on the above two
matrices. These ratios are the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix D which appear in
the key generation rate expressions of Eq. (14) and Eq. (31). The ratios are the eigenvalues
of F †0F0(F
†
1F1)
−1 and are computed to be
D1 = 3.03, D2 = 0.356. (36)
To get the key generation rate in the noiseless case, we substitute D into Eq. (14) and get
Rnoiseless = 0.496. (37)
To get the key generation rate for the general noisy case, we first compute the C matrix from
Eq. (B.16):
C =
[
0.51 −0.17
0.12 0.56
]
. (38)
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We then use C in the expressions for the various probabilities in Eqs. (23)-(26) and numerically
solve for psucc,noisy and ep in problems (P1) and (P2) for some given observed error rates.
Alternatively, one may determine suboptimal values of psucc,noisy and ep using Eqs. (27) and
(28) without computing C. Finally, the key generation rate is computed using Eq. (31). The
key generation rate for the noisy case with the assumption of eb = e
′
p is plotted in Fig. 6 along
with the corresponding filtering probability and phase error rate. Note that the minimum
efficiency ratio is 1/D1 = 0.330 and the maximum is D1 = 3.03. These are shown as the
dashed curve of Fig. 6(a) and the slope of the dashed curve of Fig. 6(b), respectively. Even
though the mismatch ratio is quite high, positive key generation rate can still be obtained.
6 Detection scheme with four phase settings
In this section, we prove how randomly switching the bit assignments of the two detectors
for each quantum signal can completely eliminate the effect of detection efficiency mismatch.
Previously, a four-phase modulation scheme was proposed [31, 32] to implement the BB84
protocol with only one detector at Bob’s side. This scheme uses only one detector to measure
both bit “0” and bit “1” . Essentially, an additional bit flip operation is performed at random
to prepare the detector for detecting bit “0” or bit “1”. So, half of the time, the detector is
used for detecting bit “0” and the other half bit “1”. To implement this method in a phase-
coding BB84 QKD system, Bob’s phase modulator applies four phase settings {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}
instead of the two {0, pi/2} in the normal case. The motivation of the original proposals [31,32]
for this scheme was to save one detector but not for security purpose. In fact, since only one
detector is used in this scheme, there is no issue of efficiency mismatch between detectors;
however, half the bits are lost, lowering the overall efficiency. Moreover, we first pointed
out [27] that the efficiency loophole could be closed by incorporating the four phase settings in
BB84 even with two detectors. Here, we rigorously prove this claim. Furthermore, we remark
that the four-phase scheme can also be used to solve the detection efficiency mismatch problem
that arises due to dead-times. In the following, we consider using two detectors together with
the four phase settings in BB84. In this case, the overall efficiency is not affected because
two detectors are used instead of one. The four phase settings are applied at Bob’s side
to “average out” the effect of the efficiency responses of the two detectors (see Fig. 7). At
first sight, the key generation rate of this scheme may appear to be the average of the rates
when Bob performs the bit flip operation and when he does not. This is because if one
considers entanglement distillation, the total entanglement available should just be the sum
of the entanglement of the two cases. However, when we are concerned with key generations,
Bob’s action on whether to flip or not is not known to Eve and thus serves to disentangle
Eve further (i.e., it acts as a shield [36]). This allows the overall key generation rate to be
higher than the average of the two cases. In what follows, we show that indeed this scheme is
capable of completely removing the effect of efficiency mismatch and the key generation rate
for the no-mismatch case is recovered.
To begin, let’s consider that Bob has a quantum coin that determines whether to apply a
bit flip operation (which is the same as switching the two detectors). The filtering operations
F ′z and F
′
x associated with the detectors’ responses are (see Fig. 5)
F ′z = Fz ⊗ |0〉C 〈0|+XBFzXB ⊗ |1〉C 〈1| (39)
F ′x = Fx ⊗ |0〉C 〈0|+ ZBFxZB ⊗ |1〉C 〈1| (40)
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Fig. 6. Efficiency mismatch example for two-dimensional efficiency matrices. Solid curves are
obtained from solving problems (P1) and (P2). Dashed curves are obtained from the suboptimal
bounds in Eqs. (27) and (28). The key generation rate is computed using Eq. (31). The maximum
efficiency mismatch ratio is D1 = 3.03.
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Fig. 7. The diagram on the left is the standard implementation of phase-encoding BB84 with
a Mach-Zehner interferometer at Bob’s side. Bob selects the measurement basis with a phase
modulator set to either 0 or pi/2. The diagram on the right is the four-phase scheme where Bob
randomly flips the bit value assignment of the two detectors with a phase modulator. The two
logical phase modulators can be implemented as one with four possible phases.
where system C represents the quantum coin, Fz is from Eq. (3), and Fx is from Eq. (4). The
entire state after Eve’s operation is [cf. Eq. (C.1), which does not involve the quantum coin]
|Ψ(l)4 〉 =
∑
i,j
E
(l,i,j)
B (|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗ (|0〉+ |1〉)C ⊗ |γ(l, i, j)〉T ⊗ |i〉E , (41)
where E
(l,i,j)
B is defined in Appendix C. We design the virtual filter GBT,4-phase so that the
resulting state GBT,4-phaseF
′
z |Ψ(l)4 〉 [Fig. 5(b)] is the same as the state used to determine the
actual phase error probability F ′x |Ψ(l)4 〉 [Fig. 5(c)]. In this way, the virtual X-basis measure-
ment and the actual X-basis measurement exhibit the same phase error probabilities.
The state from which the actual phase error rate is estimated is the state in Eq. (41)
filtered with F ′x (see Fig. 5(c)):
F ′x |Ψ(l)4 〉
=
∑
i,j
{ [aI + aX√
2
|++〉AB +
aZ − aY√
2
|−+〉AB
]
⊗ (|0〉C F0 |γ〉T + |1〉C F1 |γ〉T ) (42)
+
[aI − aX√
2
|−−〉AB +
aZ + aY√
2
|+−〉AB
]
⊗ (|0〉C F1 |γ〉T + |1〉C F0 |γ〉T )
}
⊗ |i〉E
where |γ〉T = |γ(l, i, j)〉T and aW = a(l,i,j)W ,W = {I,X, Y, Z} for simplified notation. Now,
we design GBT,4-phase so that GBT,4-phaseF
′
z |Ψ(l)4 〉 is the same as Eq. (42). Notice that
F ′z |Ψ(l)4 〉
=
∑
i,j
{ [aI + aZ√
2
|00〉AB +
aX + aY√
2
|10〉AB
]
⊗ (|0〉C F0 |γ〉T + |1〉C F1 |γ〉T ) (43)
+
[aI − aZ√
2
|11〉AB +
aX − aY√
2
|01〉AB
]
⊗ (|0〉C F1 |γ〉T + |1〉C F0 |γ〉T )
}
⊗ |i〉E .
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We heuristically design GBT,4-phase = U2U1 in two steps. First, we choose
U1 = |0〉B 〈0| ⊗ IC ⊗ IT + |1〉B 〈1| ⊗XC ⊗ IT (44)
which is basically a CNOT operation in system BC. This operation leads to
U1F
′
z |Ψ(l)4 〉
=
∑
i,j
E
(l,i,j)
B (|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗
(
|0〉C ⊗ F0 |γ(l, i, j)〉T + |1〉C ⊗ F1 |γ(l, i, j)〉T
)
⊗ |i〉E . (45)
Notice the similarity of Eq. (45) to Eq. (41) which represents the state before the detectors’
responses are applied. As a special case when there is no noise (i.e., E
(l,i,j)
B = I), Eq. (45)
becomes the perfect EPR pair in system AB tensor with system CTE, meaning that applying
the virtual filter U1 is already sufficient to completely eliminate the effect of detection efficiency
mismatch. In this special case, the probability of successful virtual filtering is 1 (since U1 is
unitary) and thus the key generation rate on detected signals is 1.
Let’s continue to design U2, which is needed for the noisy case. By choosing
U2 = |+〉B 〈+| ⊗ IC ⊗ IT + |−〉B 〈−| ⊗XC ⊗ IT , (46)
one can easily verify that U2U1F
′
z |Ψ(l)4 〉 = F ′x |Ψ(l)4 〉. Thus, the final virtual filter isGBT,4-phase =
U2U1. Note that GBT,4-phase is not F
′
xF
′−1
z in general (i.e., we did not invert the filters in an
naive way). To find the final key generation rate on detected signals, we may use Eq. (31)
with the probability of successful virtual filtering psucc,noisy = 1 (since GBT,4-phase is unitary)
to get
R4-phase = 1−H2(ep)−H2(eb) (47)
where ep is the phase error rate estimated using the actualX-basis measurement (see Fig. 5(c))
and eb is the bit error rate estimated using the actual Z-basis measurement (see Fig. 5(a)).
Apparently, this key generation rate in Eq. (47) is the same as if there is no efficiency mismatch
(e.g., Refs. [7,61]). This means that the effect of the efficiency mismatch is completely removed
by using this four-state scheme.
7 Multi-photon signals
In practice, the channel may receive multi-photon signals from Alice and may emit multi-
photon signals to Bob. We discuss this issue here.
7.1 Input with multi-photon signals
Since our detector model and proof work on the assumption that the input to Bob are single-
photon signals, applying our proof to practice settings where multi-photon signals may be
present requires special attention. In order to cope with this practical issue, one may consider
implementing the detector-decoy idea of Ref. [62] to estimate the fraction of single-photon
input to Bob. The detector-decoy idea involves the receiver Bob adding an attenuator in front
of his detector to monitor the transmission properties (e.g., transmittance and quantum bit
error rate) as a function of attenuation. By solving linear equations related to these properties,
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one can infer the fraction of single-photon input to Bob. Signals received by Bob are randomly
chosen to be used for this estimation process or the normal key generation process. Upon
knowing the fraction of single-photon input signals, one can apply the tagged-signals idea
of [17] to compute the overall key generation rate by assuming that all multi-photon input
signals are insecure and only single-photon input signals are distillable. Our proof provides
a way to compute the number of secure bits in the single-photon parts, and this is what is
needed when we apply [17] to extend the situation with multi-photon input signals. When
applying our proof in this case, one may also assume pessimistically that all errors come from
the single-photon parts. Note that when applying the idea of [17], we only need to know the
fraction of the single-photon input signals but not their positions.
7.2 Phase-randomized weak coherent source
Our proof can also be applied to the case with a phase-randomized weak coherent source, with
or without decoy states [63–70], by following the argument in [17]. Essentially, to incorporate
both multi-photon inputs and outputs, one estimates the fraction of single-photon input
signals that originated from single-photon outputs, and applies the result of [17].
8 Concluding remark
In practice, it is hard to build two identical detectors. Owing to widespread existence of
detector dead-times or different detector responses as functions of some auxiliary variables
in, for example, time, frequency or spatial domain, two detectors almost certainly exhibit
detection efficiency mismatch. For practical QKD systems to be secure, it is thus important
to prove the security of QKD systems with detection efficiency mismatch. In this paper, we
prove the security of the BB84 protocol when the detectors respond to some auxiliary domain,
in addition to the qubit space representing the information bit in the normal case. Specifically,
we show that once the detectors’ responses to the auxiliary domain (Fi) are characterized,
we can obtain an amount of privacy amplification sufficient to remove Eve’s information on
the final key. We show that this amount is directly related to the maximum efficiency ratio
between the two detectors.
We show that the detectors’ responses Fi can be characterized with a finite number of
samples even when time is the auxiliary domain by using a narrow-band frequency filter.
Thus, we may test Fi with a finite number of test signals in practice in order to characterize
it. One issue about the applicability of our proof is that we assume that the detectors’
responses Fi are stable over time. Once we have stable estimates of Fi from testing the
detectors, our proof can be applied to obtain the final key generation rate.
The key generation rate derived in this paper may not be optimal and there may be ways
to improve it. Our speculation is based on two observations: one in the noiseless case and
another in the noisy case. For the first observation in the noiseless case, suppose that the
two detectors have different scalar efficiencies, i.e. Fi = ηi. In this case, the state shared
by Alice and Bob is
√
η0 |00〉 + √η1 |11〉. Since there are 2Nh2(η0/(η0+η1)) typical strings,
the key generation rate is simply h2(η0/(η0 + η1)), which may be obtained by applying the
appropriate amount of privacy amplification (see also [49]). On the other hand, our current
proof yields a key generation rate of 2min(η0, η1)/(η0+ η1) (see Eq. (15)), which is in general
smaller. For the second observation in the noisy case, we see in Example 1 (see Sec. 5.4) that
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a simple data-discarding argument can produce a higher key generation rate than our proof
(when having scalar efficiencies). Thus, we speculate that there may be ways to improve the
key generation rate even in the general noisy case where non-scalar detection efficiencies Fi
are used. The source of sub-optimality of our current proof may be that we distinguish non-
orthogonal states on Bob’s side on each signal independently. Thus, it would be interesting to
apply a collective method for entanglement concentration, instead of the Procrustean method
for entanglement concentration, to the context of QKD. We leave this potential improvement
for future work.
We have shown rigorously that using four phase settings in BB84 can equalize the detection
efficiencies for bits “0” and “1”, thus solving the detection efficiency mismatch problem.
However, as noted in our introduction, Eve may try to break this four-state-measurement
counter-measure by using a combined strong pulse attack and time-shift attack [30,34]. This
demonstrates that counter-measures may lead to new attacks.
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Appendix A: Analysis of time-dependent efficiency
Here, we justify that the efficiency response of a detector can be characterized with a finite
number of samples when a narrow-band filter is placed before the detector.
Before we begin, we remark that we will work on the baseband signals, even though the
signals are modulated to a higher carrier frequency before detection. This is valid because
practical detectors are not fast enough to respond to the optical frequency of the input signal.
So only the envelope of the signal, which is equivalent to the baseband of the signal, will be
detected. Thus, with this built-in demodulation function in the detectors, we can work on
the baseband signals.
Suppose that the input (quantum) signal at the detector location is E(t), and the Gaussian-
shaped frequency filter is g(f) and has an effective bandwidth of B. Since the filter has a
fixed bandwidth, we can assume without loss of generality that the input signal also has a
fixed bandwidth B. Then the input signal in the frequency domain can be expressed as
E(f) = [E(f) ∗
∞∑
k=−∞
δ(f − 2Bk)]h(f) (A.1)
30 Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
where h(f) is the perfect rectangular filter with bandwidth B, and the asterisk denotes con-
volution. Here, we are essentially repeating E(f) indefinitely with a separation of 2B and
then chopping the spectrum with the low-pass filter h(f). This can be seen by noting that
E(f)∗δ(f −2B) = E(f −2B). This step may look superfluous, but the reason for this will be
clear when we look at the time domain. The output of the filter is, in the frequency domain,
E′(f) = E(f)g(f) (A.2)
= [E(f) ∗
∞∑
k=−∞
δ(f − 2Bk)]g(f) (A.3)
where we have used the fact that g(f) = g(f)h(f). In the time domain, the output is obtained
through the Fourier transform:
E′(t) = (2B)−1[E(t)
∞∑
k=−∞
δ(t− k/(2B))] ∗ g(t). (A.4)
Here, we have used the convolution property of the Fourier transform which says that con-
volution in the time domain becomes multiplication in the frequency domain and vice versa.
Also, we used the fact that the Fourier transform of an impulse train is also an impulse train,
i.e.,
∞∑
k=−∞
δ(f − 2Bk)↔ (2B)−1
∞∑
k=−∞
δ(t− k/(2B)) (A.5)
are a Fourier transform pair. Finally, we expand the convolution in Eq. (A.4) to get
E′(t) = (2B)−1
∞∑
k=−∞
E(k/(2B))g(t− k/(2B)). (A.6)
This last equation illustrates the key point, which is that given any input signal E(t), the
output of the filter can always be represented by a train of Gaussian pulses (possibly with
different amplitudes) spaced at 1/(2B) time intervals. Thus, the detector always receives a
train of Gaussian pulses located at fixed time instants and if the fixed length of the gating
window is taken into account, one can characterize the detector with a finite number of
pulses sent within the gating window. Therefore, the detection efficiency response Fi
†Fi
effectively becomes finite dimensional. This proves that with an addition of a frequency filter,
the characterization of the time-dependent efficiency of the detectors becomes discrete and
finite-dimensional, and thus is readily applicable to our security proof. Note that although
our analysis does not explicitly involve quantum mechanics, the analysis is still applicable to
quantum states since the Fourier transform is an unitary transformation (also linear) that
changes between the time basis and the frequency basis, and the quantities E(f) and E(t)
can be regarded as the amplitudes of a quantum state in the respective basis.
Appendix B: Determination of Bob’s virtual filter for the noiseless case
We determine Bob’s virtual filter GBT in Eq. (9) by finding the matrix C ∈ Cd×d. Since
a valid filter GBT must satisfy G
†
BTGBT ≤ I, we find C such that this is satisfied while
C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma 31
maximizing the key generation rate in Eq. (13). This problem can be expressed as
max
C
min
|γ〉
2 〈γ| (C†C)T ⊗ IE |γ〉TE
〈γ| (F †0F0 + F †1F1)T ⊗ IE |γ〉TE
(B.1)
s.t. G†BTGBT ≤ I. (B.2)
Note that since we are interested in the worst-case key generation rate, we form a max-min
problem as opposed to a min-max problem, in light of the max-min inequality: maxaminb
f(a, b) ≤ minbmaxa f(a, b).
To solve this optimization problem, first note that the condition G†BTGBT ≤ I is the same
as the condition GBTG
†
BT ≤ I, which can be expanded (by using Eq. (9)) as
|0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ C(F †0F0)−1C† + |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ C(F †1F1)−1C† ≤ I. (B.3)
Letting C = C1U
†F0 where C1 ∈ Cd×d will be determined next, U ∈ Cd×d is the unitary ma-
trix of the Hermitian decomposition of F0(F
†
1F1)
−1F †0 = UDU
†, and D = diag(D1, . . . , Dd)
is a diagonal matrix with positive real elements, Eq. (B.3) can be expressed as
|0z〉B 〈0z| ⊗ C1C†1 + |1z〉B 〈1z| ⊗ C1DC†1 ≤ I. (B.4)
This allows us to redefine the constraints of the problem.
Next, we consider the objective function in Eq. (B.1), which can be simplified as
2 〈γ| (C†C)T |γ〉
〈γ| (F †0F0 + F †1F1)T |γ〉
(B.5)
=
2 〈γ′| (F †0
−1
C†CF−10 )T |γ′〉
〈γ′| (I + F †0
−1
F †1F1F
−1
0 )T |γ′〉
(B.6)
=
2 〈γ′′| (C†1C1)T |γ′′〉
〈γ′′| (I +D−1)T |γ′′〉 (B.7)
=
2 〈γ′′′| ((I +D−1)−1/2C†1C1(I +D−1)−1/2)T |γ′′′〉
〈γ′′′ |γ′′′〉 . (B.8)
Now, the problem can be re-written as
Rnoiseless = max
C2
min
|γ〉
2 〈γ| (C†2C2)T ⊗ IE |γ〉TE
〈γ |γ〉 (B.9)
s.t. C2(I +D
−1)C†2 ≤ I (B.10)
C2(I +D)C
†
2 ≤ I (B.11)
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where C2 = C1(I +D
−1)−1/2. We further simply the problem as
Rnoiseless = 2max
C2
[minimum eigenvalue of C†2C2] (B.12)
s.t. C2


1 + 1D1
. . .
1 + 1Dd

C†2 ≤ I (B.13)
C2


1 +D1
. . .
1 +Dd

C†2 ≤ I. (B.14)
The solution is
C2 =


√
min
(
1
1+D1
, D11+D1
)
. . . √
min
(
1
1+Dd
, Dd1+Dd
)


(B.15)
C =


√
min
(
1
D1
, 1
)
. . . √
min
(
1
Dd
, 1
)


U †F0, (B.16)
and the final key generation rate can be obtained by substituting Eq. (B.15) into Eq. (B.12):
Rnoiseless = 2min
(
1
1 +D1
,
1
1 + 1/D1
,
1
1 +D2
, . . .
)
=
2
1 +max
(
D1,
1
D1
, . . . , Dd,
1
Dd
) .
Appendix C: Simplification of Eqs. (19)-(22)
Here, we show how to simplify eb in Eq. (19). The other quantities in Eqs. (20)-(22) can be
similarly simplified.
Let’s re-write Eq. (16) by separating the operations for systems B and T by expressing
E
(l,i)
BT =
∑
j E
(l,i,j)
B ⊗ E(l,i,j)T :
|Ψ(l)2 〉 =
∑
i,j
E
(l,i,j)
B (|00〉+ |11〉)AB ⊗ |γ(l,i,j)〉T ⊗ |i〉E (C.1)
where |γ(l,i,j)〉 = E(l,i,j)T |0〉. Consider Eq. (17) which is expanded as
Fz |Ψ(l)2 〉 =
∑
i,j
{[
a
(l,i,j)
00 |00〉AB + a(l,i,j)10 |10〉AB
]
⊗ F0 |γ(l, i, j)〉T + (C.2)
[
a
(l,i,j)
01 |01〉AB + a(l,i,j)11 |11〉AB
]
⊗ F1 |γ(l, i, j)〉T
}
⊗ |i〉E
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where
a
(l,i,j)
00 =
a
(l,i,j)
I + a
(l,i,j)
Z√
2
a
(l,i,j)
01 =
a
(l,i,j)
X − a(l,i,j)Y√
2
(C.3)
a
(l,i,j)
10 =
a
(l,i,j)
X + a
(l,i,j)
Y√
2
a
(l,i,j)
11 =
a
(l,i,j)
I − a(l,i,j)Z√
2
(C.4)
and Eve’s operation is expressed in terms of the Pauli matrices as E
(l,i,j)
B = a
(l,i,j)
I I+a
(l,i,j)
X X+
a
(l,i,j)
Y iY + a
(l,i,j)
Z Z. Using this notation in Eq. (19), we have
eb =
∑
l,i,j,j′ a
J′
10
†
aJ10 〈γJ
′ |F †0F0 |γJ〉+ aJ
′
01
†
aJ01 〈γJ
′ |F †1F1 |γJ〉∑
l,i,j,j′ (a
J′
10
†
aJ10 + a
J′
00
†
aJ00) 〈γJ′ |F †0F0 |γJ〉+ (aJ′01†aJ01 + aJ′11†aJ11) 〈γJ′ |F †1F1 |γJ〉
(C.5)
where, for simplicity, J ′ means (l, i, j′) and J means (l, i, j). Focusing on the first term in the
numerator with fixed l and i, it is equal to
∑
j,j′
aJ
′
10
†
aJ10 〈γJ
′ |F †0F0 |γJ〉 (C.6)
=
(〈γ(l,i,0)| 〈γ(l,i,1)| · · ·)




a
(l,i,0)†
10 a
(l,i,0)
10 a
(l,i,0)†
10 a
(l,i,1)
10 · · ·
a
(l,i,1)†
10 a
(l,i,0)
10
. . .
...

⊗ F †0F0




|γ(l,i,0)〉
|γ(l,i,1)〉
...

 .
(C.7)
The second matrix can immediately be recognized as A(l,i)†Z˜10A
(l,i) where Z˜10 is from
Eq. (C.11) below and
A(l,i) =


a
(l,i,0)
I a
(l,i,1)
I · · ·
a
(l,i,0)
X a
(l,i,1)
X · · ·
a
(l,i,0)
Y a
(l,i,1)
Y · · ·
a
(l,i,0)
Z a
(l,i,1)
Z · · ·

 . (C.8)
By letting
|φ(l, i)〉 = (A(l,i) ⊗ I)


|γ(l,i,0)〉
|γ(l,i,1)〉
...

 (C.9)
where the identity matrix has dimensions d×d and applying similar arguments to other terms,
we have
eb =
∑
l,i 〈φ(l, i)| [Z˜10 ⊗ F †0F0 + Z˜01 ⊗ F †1F1] |φ(l, i)〉∑
l,i 〈φ(l, i)| [(Z˜00 + Z˜10)⊗ F †0F0 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F †1F1] |φ(l, i)〉
(C.10)
where Z˜i,j are constant matrices shown below in Eq. (C.11). Finally, by letting ρE =∑
l,i |φ(l, i)〉 〈φ(l, i)|, Eq. (C.10) becomes Eq. (23). Similarly, Eqs. (20)-(22) can be simplified
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where Z˜i,j and X˜i,j are
Z˜00 = P ([1, 0, 0, 1]
†)/2 X˜++ = P ([1, 1, 0, 0]
†)/2
Z˜10 = P ([0, 1, 1, 0]
†)/2 X˜−+ = P ([0, 0,−1, 1]†)/2
Z˜01 = P ([0, 1,−1, 0]†)/2 X˜+− = P ([0, 0, 1, 1]†)/2 (C.11)
Z˜11 = P ([1, 0, 0,−1]†)/2 X˜−− = P ([1,−1, 0, 0]†)/2.
Here, P (|·〉) = |·〉 〈·| is the projection operator.
Appendix D: Solving for the suboptimal bounds
Here, we prove Eqs. (27) and (28). First, we consider solving
psucc,noisy ≥ min
|φ〉
〈φ| I ⊗ C†C |φ〉
〈φ| [(Z˜00 + Z˜10)⊗ F †0F0 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F †1F1] |φ〉
(D.1)
where the right hand side comes from Eq. (26) and Z˜00 + Z˜10+ Z˜11+ Z˜01 = I. Here, we only
need to focus on rank-one ρE = |φ〉 〈φ| because of the following claim.
Claim 1 Given two ratios, a1a2 and
b1
b2
, where a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ R+, if a1a2 ≥
b1
b2
, then a1a2 ≥
a1+b1
a2+b2
.
Similarly, if a1a2 ≤
b1
b2
, then a1a2 ≤
a1+b1
a2+b2
.
This claim basically means that we only need to focus on the smallest or the largest ratio
when there are more than one ratio to optimize over. By substituting |φ′〉 = [(Z˜00 + Z˜10) ⊗
F0 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F1] |φ〉 into the right hand side of Eq. (D.1), we get
psucc,noisy ≥ min
|φ〉
〈φ′| [(Z˜00 + Z˜10)⊗ F−†0 C†CF−10 + (Z˜11 + Z˜01)⊗ F−†1 C†CF−11 ] |φ′〉
〈φ′ |φ′〉 . (D.2)
By noting that Z˜00+ Z˜10 and Z˜11+ Z˜01 are orthogonal, the minimum eigenvalue of Eq. (D.2)
is the minimum of the eigenvalues of F−†i C
†CF−1i where i = 0, 1. By using Eq. (B.16), one
can immediately see that the eigenvalues of F−†0 C
†CF−10 are
min
(
1
Di
, 1
)
i = 1, . . . , d (D.3)
and that of F−†1 C
†CF−11 are
min(Di, 1) i = 1, . . . , d. (D.4)
Taking the minimum of these two sets of eigenvalues gives Eq. (27).
Next, we consider the maximization of ep/e
′
p in Eq. (28). Using Eqs. (24) and (25) (and
Claim 1), we have
ep
e′p
=
〈φ| X˜−+ ⊗ C†C |φ〉+ 〈φ| X˜+− ⊗ C†C |φ〉
〈φ| X˜−+ ⊗ F †0F0 |φ〉+ 〈φ| X˜+− ⊗ F †1F1 |φ〉
×
〈φ| (X˜++ + X˜−+)⊗ F †0F0 |φ〉+ 〈φ| (X˜−− + X˜+−)⊗ F †1F1 |φ〉
〈φ| (X˜++ + X˜−+)⊗ C†C |φ〉+ 〈φ| (X˜−− + X˜+−)⊗ C†C |φ〉
. (D.5)
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According to Claim 1, the first ratio in Eq. (D.5) is upper bounded by the maximum of the
eigenvalues of F−†i C
†CF−1i where i = 0, 1; while the second ratio is upper bounded by inverse
of the minimum of the same set of eigenvalues. Therefore, using Eqs. (D.3)-(D.4),
ep
e′p
≤ 1
min
(
D1,
1
D1
, . . . , Dd,
1
Dd
, 1
) (D.6)
where the numerator (= 1) corresponds to the upper bound on the first ratio. This proves
Eq. (28).
